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NO. 6253

In the Supreme Court, State of Utah
joHN A. MALIA, State Bank Commissioner
of the State of Utah, and HERBERT TAYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank of Heber City,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

j. HAROLD GILES and JosiE BAIRD GILES,
Defendants and Appellants.

12·66 Civil

A. C. MouLTON and E. DEWEY MouLTON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
V'S.

VERNOR E. BAJRD and MARY A. BAIRD,
His Wife,]. RuLoN MoRGAN, ]. RuLON
MoRGAN, as the Surviving Partner of the
Firm of Morgan & Morgan, a Co-Partnership, ELIZABETH j. BAIRD, BANK OF
HEBER CITY, RuLON F. STARLEY, State
Bank Commissioner of the State of Utah,
and SPENCER C. TAYLOR, as Examiner
in Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank
of Heber City, ARTHUR DuKE and
EuLEAN DuKE, His Wife, RAY F.
SMITH and JosiE BAJRD GILES SMITH,
His Wife, and j. HAROLD GILES,

1410 Civil

Defendants and Appellants.
}. RuLON MoRGAN,

Cross-Complainant,
vs.
RuLON F. STARLEY, as Bank Commissioner
of the State of Utah, and SPENCER C.
TAYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of the
Liquidation of the Bank of Heber City,

Cross-Defendants.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Appeal From Fourth District, Wasatch County.
Honorable Dallas H. Young, Judge.
CHENEY, jENSEN, MARR & WILKINS, GEORGE B. STANLEY,
PAUL B. CANNON AND DELBERT M. DRAPER,

Attorne:ys for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
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On the day previous to the oral argument in this case
Appellants served Respondents with a typewritten Reply
Brief. Because ·of two new points raised in the Reply
Brief which had not be-en mentioned in the original B~rief
of Appellants, Respondents ~asked and were granted
leave to file this Supplemental Brief to deal with such
new matters. Respondents have not yet been served with
the printed Reply Brief but are as:suming that it will be
substantially in accordance with the typewritten Brief
heretofore served.

The first new point raised by Appellants is, assuming the AppeHants are sustained by this Court in their
contenti·O'l1 against the Bank of Heber ~City and its successor in interest and .the ease reversed as to this matter
but not as to the remainder of the case, such reversal
cannot benefit the Respondents, A. C. Moulton and E.
D·ewey M·oulton, Plaintiffs in Case No. 1410 ~Civil, who
are opposed to the bank, but who did not appeal. The
Trial Court held that the claim of the Bank of Heber ;City
is superior as to the water stock; that the cl,aim of A. C.
l\f·oulton 'and E. Dewey Moulton is superior to all o~tber
parties both as to the "\vater stock and to the real
property.
1

'Several Utah cases are cited by Appellants. The
only two ''Thich appear analogous to the present situation
)are Lowe & Company v. Leary, 49 Utah 506, 164 Pac..
105·2 ~and H'ansen v. Daniels, 73 Uta·h 142, 272 Pa.c. 941.
These cases -vve believe a:re clearly. distinguis,hable. In
the first case there were a nurnber of claimants whose
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rights t·o a lien ·against a fund "'t.)re denied, the Court
holding that the fund should be administered by a truste~
in bankruptcy. Only part of the claimants a:pp.ea.led.
None of the .other claimants "\vere parties to the appe~al
either as appellants or respondents. 1'his Court :made
the f-ollo,ving statement in regard to the rights of nonappealing parties :
'"\\Thile it is true that there were ather claimants, yet when the District Court rendered a decision adversely to their claims, that is, when the
said court decided that t'he claim of the trustee
in bankruptcy was superior to their claims, then,
instead of appealing to this .court ~as the plaintiffs
have done, those ·Claimants acquiesced in the decision of the District c.o-urt. All ,of those claimants thus have adopted the decision of the District
Court as the lavY of the cas.e, and hence have
\vaived their rights to pa.rticipa te in the fund left
in the hands of the school district. We can only
help those who have attempted .to help themselves.
N·or is the trustee in bankruptcy in a position to
help those claimants out of the dilemma in which
they hav-e pl.aJc.ed themselves by acquiescing in the
decision of the District Court. So far as they
are concerned, therefore, tha;t court's de~cision is
the lattv of this case."
1

The clear distinction between that case and ·the ca.se
before the court is that the District Court has found and
adjudi.c.a ted that the rights .of A. rC. Moulton a·nd E.
Dewey Moulton in and to the water stock and all real
property are superior to the rights of Appellants. See
Findings of Fact num·bered 12 and 13 (Ab. 86 and 87),
Conclusions .of La'v numbered 4, 5, and 6 (Ab. 98 and 9-9')
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and :nara.graphs 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 of the D·ecree (A b. 105106.-l97-108). Unless these por~tions of the Findings,
C:onclusions and Decree are revers-ed they must, according to the rule laid down in the Lowe case, remain as the
law. of the case. In the Lo-we case the non-appealing
parties had been. given no rights by the Trial O'ourt.
Here the Moultons have been given eomplete priority
over: Appellants by the Trial ·C·ourt. Unless this is
reversed no~ legal manipulation -can possibly put anyone
but tihe bank ahead of the Moultons.
In the ease of H'arnsen v. Da.niels, eited by Appellants,
the rr:nal C-ourt had held that the non -appealing parties
had no lien upon the property. In the case a·t bar a lien
has been established.
It is noticeable that Counsel for . A. ppellants has not
referred to the ;case of Garrison v. Da.vis, 88 Utah 35B,
14 Pac. ( 2d) 439·, wh.erein it is held, Elias Hansen speaking for the Court, that cer~tain non-appealing parties
could hav.e the 'advantage of a reversal upon appeal.
That ·Case, it seems to us, must necessarily be considered
by the Court on this point. It was there held that vvhere
parties ·were owners in common of certain water, an a ppeal by one of those parties inured to the benefit of all.
If ·where .the parties a:re ow·ners in common, such benefit
results, a .benefit n1ust necessarily result where the nonappealing party not only has a common interest in the
\

pr;operty but has an interest adjudicated to be superior
to that of the appealing p~rty.

:s:ee also the case of

Buskirk v. Musick (W. Va. 19:25), 130 S. E. 435.
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While 've believe that the .case before the Court is
cle~1rly distinguishable from the eases of Lotve v. Leary
and Hansell r. Daniels "~e believe that there are 1nany
courts "~hich haYe held contrary to the Lowe ease and
that upon proper oonsideration this Court should overrule it, if ~t has not already been overruled by Ga,rrison
r. D·avis. See Walker's Executors v. Page, 21 Grat. 63-6,
62 Vir. 636, and many ca.ses cited in the dissenting opinion to the case of Ottunuva Boiler Works v. M. J. 0'Meara & Sou, 224 N. W. 803.
Another point raised in t'he Reply BTief vvhich was
not presented in the original Brief of Appellants is the
reliane-e upon Sections 38-0-4, 38-0-10 and 38-0-13, Revis,ed
Statutes of Utah, 1933, for H homestead. It is claimed,
apparently, tha.t because the wife did not sign the pledge
of the stock there -could be no loss of homestead and. this
even though the ~us band is found to have been her agent
duly authorized to pledge the stock. This on its face
is falacious for the reason that the a.et of an agent is the
ac.t of the piincipal.
However, we wish to point out that if Josie Baird
Giles S1nith still ·held any interest in the stock after i•ts
pledge to the bank she sold that inter~est to Vern•OT Baird
in ().ctober, 1g.2·9 and thereafter held only alien upon sueh
stock by reason of 'a mor-tgage back from Vernor. There
is no povision that a h·omestead right -exists in a lien.
Hhl~ was

not thereafter using the water stock upon land

owned by her as required by !Section 38-0-4, Revised
~tntutes

of Utah., 1933.

The

quota~tion

of that ·section
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in the type\vritten Reply Brief of Appellants, omits the
w·ords ''in supplying W'ater to the homestead''. The
statemen't that she was using the water on her land after
192'9 is contrary to the fact. The record shows that
Vern or took a deed in 1'929 and had possession to the
end of 1934. It was deeded to Elizabet·h Baird in J,anuary, 1935. The homestead in the water stock was there£o·re lost for three reasons. She pledged the stock by
a duly authorized agent in May, 19·29. ;S:he thereafter
lost her interest by sale to Vernor. Thirdly she has no
homeste,ad in t·he water for the reason that it has not
been used by her ·on her property sinc.e 1929.
Respectfully submitted,
CHENEY, JENSEN, MARR
GEORGE
PAUL

B.

B.

DELBERT

& WILKINS,

STANLEY,

CANNON,

M.

D·RAPER,

Attor111eys for P"lain.tiffs
arnd Respondents.
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joHN A. MALIA, State Bank Commissioner of the
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1266
Civil

vs.
]. HAROLD GILES and JosiE BAIRD GILES,

Defendants and Appellants.
A. C. MouLTON and

E. DEWEY MouLTON,
Plaintiffs and

Re~.pondents.

vs.
VERN OR E. BAIRD and MARY A~. BAIRD, his wife,
]. RuLON ·MoRGAN, ]. RuLoN ·MORGAN, as
the Surviving Partner of the Firm of ,M organ &
Morgan, a Co-Partnership, ELIZABETH ]. BAIRD,
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State Bank 'Commissioner of the State of Utah, and
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vs.
RULON F. STARLEY, as Bank ·Commissioner of the
State of Utah, and SPENCER C. TAYLOR, as
Examiner in Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank
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Come now Rulon F. ,Starley, as Bank :C:ommissioner
of the ,State of Utah, and Spencer ~c. Taylor, as Examiner
in 'Charge of the Liquidation of the B·ank of Heher City,
respondents in case No. 1'26.6 ~Civil, and A. C. Moulton
and E. Dewey Moulton, respondents in case No. 1410
Civil, and respectfully petition this Honorable 1Court to
grant a re-hearing in the above entitled cause.
The S'pecific reasons for requesting a re-hearing in
,case No. 126:6 Civil are the following:

I.
·T.he ·Court errs in the ·conclusion and statement that
the signature of the owner must be indorsed upon the
ple-dg~d

certificates, or written authority of the agent

must accompany the certificates.
In its ·Opinion, this ··court holds that an agency may
be established by conduct of the parties; that Harold
Giles was the .agent of Josie Baird Giles, but that he
could not· transfer her stock certificates without her indorsement of the certificates or written power of attorney
to him, authorizing indorsement. This b~r to transfer
is s:aid to rest on Section 18-3-1, R. S. U. 193'3, and upon
the .alleged fact that, ''there is no ·evidence in the case
that would justify the belief that Mr. Giles was a~
thorized to sign his wife's name to any instrument."
We respectfully s·ubmi t that .Section 18-3-1, supra,
is not a bar, and that the re.cord is full of evidence that
justifies the belief that Mr. ffiles was authorized to
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borro"l" money for the business of himself and wife and
to pledge their business property therefor.
Section 18-3-1, supra, must he read in conjunction
·with the ""'hole of Chapter 3,_-of 'vhich it is a p-art. Perusal
of the "Thole chapter disclos~s :
18-3-4.
Right.''

"Possession of ·Certificate Gives P'referred

18-3-7. (4) The possession of the certificat~ ma.y
be reclaimed and the tr.ansfer thereof recinded, unless( a) The certinca te has been transferred to a purchaser
for value in good faith without notice of any facts making th~ transfer wrongful; or (h) The injured person has
e~ected to waive the inj-ury, or has been guilty of laches
in endeavoring to enforce his rights.
18-3-9. If the own_er delivers the certificate without
indorsement, with intent to transfer, he has o·bligation to
indorse.
'' Beicause the statute says, 'signed by the
owner' it is claimed that no -one other than the
actual and lawful owner of the :certincate could
legally or rightfully -confer title to another, and,
as Thomas ·Wright, Jr., when he indorsed and
transferred the certificate to the plaintiff, was not
the real owner of the certiflca te, the plaintiff acquired no right therein. ;S-o construing the statute, a bona. fide plrr·chaser for value can acquire
title only from the real or actual owner or his
duly authorized agent. tSuch a construction
renders the principle of caveat emptor to its full
extent applicable to all sales and deliveries of
stock -certificates, the same a.s it is applicable to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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chattels. * * * Under the facts as found the
appellant is estopped from disputing the ownership of the certificate in Thomas Wright, Jr. *
* * Lastly, it is also urged that th~ plaintiff
was not a ·bona fide purchaser, and was put upon
inquiry as to the validity of Thomas Wright's title
and given notice of some infirmity or defe-ct in his
title ~because the plaintiff did not have a transfer
mad·e on the books of the company. * * *
That may have been a suspi~cious circumstance of
more or less weight, but, when considered in connection with the whole of the transaction, is not
in itself of such controlling force as to overthrow
the finding- of bona fides, or to justify a contrary
finding.'' :Brown v. Wright, 48 Utah 633, 61 P.ac.
448.
''The finding of the court is tha:t neither of
the banks who loaned money upon the ·certifi·cate
had any notice so far as Argyle vvas eoncernAd.
In view of that, therefore, the equities of the
plaintiff are superior to those. of the appellant.''
Garfield B~anking Co. v. Argyle, et al., ·64 Utah
572, 23'2. Pac. 541.
·
The law a.s above stated must be applied to the following facts :
1. Harold ~Giles was the agent, and it may be held
without undue stretching of the facts, the partner of ·Josie
Baird ·Giles with full power to handle all property and
business of Josie Baird ·Giles, which indisputably was
their joint ·business, and to do all things necessary and
desirable to the conduct of that business. Borrowing
money on security was the regular practice of Harold
Giles from the day he married Josie B.aird in 1924 to
the time of their divorce in 19B4. (ISee Plaintiff's Exhibit
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13.) The lower court held that "they operated and managed their business affairs without distinction as to
ownership thereof.'' (Ab. 95) This court in its opinion
held that Josie Baird Giles indorsed one of the certificates and that J. Harold 'Giles signed the name of Josie
Baird Giles to the other. This

~court

further held in its

opinion that all of the pr~pe-rty 'vas owned ;by her, and
that all of the notes were signed ·by him. For five years
previous to the pledge, he had 'been borrowing money for
their joint business upon her property from the Bank of
Heber City. We submit that the ~hank under such circumstances ~and findings is a bona fid~ holder for value.·
2. Josie :Baird Giles (Smith) testified that ·she first
learned
the pledge in 1933. At no place in her testimony or in her pleadings did she recind the action of her
husband in pledging the stock. She made no demand for
it from the Bank or its liquidators. 1Sh·e at no place
repudiated the action of her hushand in pledging the
stock. tS.he ratified all of his actions and ma.ny times
testified that he was handling all of the '·' busin·ess.''
What he did was satisfactory to her.

of

The eourt errs in the ·conclusion and statement that
there is no evidence to show that .J.osie Baird Giles knew,
or should have known, of the pledge.
1

Attention is ·c:alled to Plaintiff's Exhibit 10. This is
a promissory note made on the day Josie sold her home
in Reher ;Qity (.Nb. 133; Tr. 96-9t7). A careful comparison ·Of the signatures of Josie Baird ~Giles and the
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writing on the note show that the note was made out by
her and all of th~ endorsements on the back are in her
handwriting. ·Notice the '"B'' in the word "'Bank" and
her signatures.
The notations on the back of the note show a complete ·knowledge of Harold's dealings on the part of
Josie. "·$1·505.3'5

B~ank

-

7th Oct.'' This corresponds

with the re.cords in the B·ank. {Ab. 1'54; Tr. 200) ""$153.00
to

mother~''

This· corresponds with the P·ecree of Dis-

tribution in the Estate of James R. Baird wherein Josie
gav~ her mother a not~ for $153,.'33 t~ halanee the estate
affairs. (Plaintiff's E·xhibit 8) Then follow several items
showing payments to various individuals, sundries, shoes,
insurance, lights and ·wiring. All of this .bookkeeping
was carefully kept by Josie herself and not by Harold.
Further, J:osie in her testimony showed that the husband
and'wife worked together in this deal when she testified
that "We used th~ money to pay bills at the Heber ~City
Bank, but I don't know exactly the amount we paid to
the bank.'' (Ab. 133; Tr. 97) ·The money represented by
this note "\vas used to pay Josie's de'bts as well as those
of Harold ;Giles at th~ hank. Josie kept aceount of the
money paid to the ~bank on the note se-cured by the pledged
stock owned by Josie. It .would take a long stretch of
the imagination to ~eonclude from the foregoing that a
care:ful bookkeeper ·such as Josie was, requiring such account.ings from the _.hushand as she required, knew nothing
of the pledge of the water stock to the bank in the midst
of 'an of the dealings in which the stock was involved.
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\v...hy did she take a note from her hushand, Harold Giles 1

The note was to pay her bills as well as his. Nothing is
in the record to sho". · The only logical supposition was
that Josie might be protected for the return of the
pledged "\Vater stock after its release by the bank.
We sub~it that Case N-o. 1266 is in no way related
to Case No. 1410 except for the purpose. of trial. The law
followed by the lower e.ourt was the same a.s that followed by the court on appeal.

The lower court having

heard the testimony of the witnesses and judged their
demeanor in open court should be followed in its findings
and the judgment of the lower

~court

sustained on the

appeal, in JCase No. 1266 Civil.

* * * * * *
The specific reason for requesting a· re-hearing in
case No. 1410 Civil is the· following:
The court erred in finding that George B. :Staniey
represented ..conflicting interests.
To support this -contention, the following argument
is made:
In order to represent conflicting interests in this
matter, ·George B. Stanley must be the attorney for Josie
~~aird Giles ('Smith); or
Vernor E. B·aird must have .had a property interest
in the note, mortgage and water stock attached in the
relationship of c-reditor; or
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'The intere·sts of Vernor E. Baird must have been
adverse to the interests of the Moultons.
T,o ·consider the first proposition, this -court found
that 'George B. ,stanley was the attorney for Vernor E.
Baird in the preparation of the deed, note ,and mortgage~
It did not find that he was at all an attorney for Josie
Baird rGiles (:Smith). The lower court found that ~George
B ..Stanley was not in the relation of attorney and client
to any of the parties. There is no further argument
necessary on this point.

In lconsidering Vernor's interest in the note, it is
necessary to quote some of the -court's opinion.
court said that George B.

~Stanley

The

'''placed his client's

property in the hands of third parties,. to the client's
detriment.'' The

reco~d

does not 'bear out this statement.

Vernor 'E. Baird had no property interest whatever in
the note and m-ortgage attached. The note and mortgage
belonged to .Josie Baird ~Giles (Smith) who was not the
client ·of George B. Stanley. There is no showing in the
record that. 'George B ..Stanley had in his possession any
property belongi~g to Vernor E. Baird.·
The record does not show any conflict of interest
between Vernor E. Baird and the Moultons. There has
b~en ·no harm ·come to Vernor ·E. Baird because of the
attachment of the note and ·mortgage. After the attachment, he 'eonveyed all of his interest in the mortgaged
property to his mother on January 26th, 19~3'5. At the
time of the ·commencement of the action in 1410 Civil,
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Vernor E .. Baird had no interest in the property sought
to be foreclosed. His pleadings show that he disclaimed
any interest therein. ('Plaintiff's Exhi·bit 1) It was stipulated befor~ the trial .commenced that no deficiency
judgment would ·be taken in the action, and this offer wa.s
made in open court at the c-ommencement of the trial by
the Moultons. (Tr. 4-'5) The foreclosure was necessary
T!Q OLBT·AIN PAYMENT .OF THE D·E:BT ·DUE AND
·OWING BY JOSIE B1AIRiD GILE;S T·O· THE M·O·U,L:TO·N:s. Josie still owed the dHbt when the foreclosure
commenced ·even though J. Rulon M·organ, her a.tt~rney,
had prepared a series of conveyances the result of which
was intended to release her from paying her honest
obligation.
The court further states: ''But for the acts of M·r.
Stanley, Vernor Baird's obligations to his ·sister would
have been

peac~ably

settled.'' ·There is nothing in the

record to show that they were not peaceably settled. The
attachment was made July 7th, 1934.

The sale which

took place on J anua.ry 2'9th, 19·35 would have done nothing
more than substitute the Moultons for Josie B;aird Giles
as owners and holders of the note ·sued upon in 1410
Civil. Settlement of the obligation between the Moultons
and Vernor E. B:aird was impossible after January 29th,
19,3:5 for the reason tha.t Vernor had conveyed all of his
interest in the mortgaged property to his mother. This
impossible situation was created ;by J. Rulon Morgan, who
prepared the deed from Vernor' to his mother, the mortgage from Vern or to l\-forgan & M.organ, the release of
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mortgage (Defendant's exhibits D, E and I) on January
26th, 1'935. Vern or was out on the desert and William
H. B·aird took the deed and mortga.ge out for him to sign.
(Ab. 201; Tr. 870-371) After this; he took no interest
in the matter, even though he signed pleadings, as is
evidenced by the fact that the trial ~commenced on September 11th, 1939 (Tr. 2), and Vernor did not appear
until'September 18th, 1'93'9. ('Tr. 357-'358) S·ever:al times
mention is made that Vernor will later he a.t the trial,
the most conspicuous of which is made by :Judge Han-sen,
when spealring.of V~rnor E. Baird, he states: ''For your
information, we hope to have him here today.'' (Tr. 282)
This was in the latter part of the trial and the statement
when studied carefully shows that Vernor had no interest
in the trial, and the other defendants were hopeful that
he might show up to testify for them.
1

George B. Stanley was still representing Vernor 'E.
Ba.ir·d -on February 4th, 1938. (Ab. 201; Tr. 371) Would
he have an :adv·erse attorney still do work for

him~

Respondents and their Counsel respectfully submit
that the opinion of the ·C~:nirt is in error in the particulars
noted, and that a re-hearing_ of this cause should be
granied.
PAUL

B.

CANNON,

c.,
It) k
GEORGE B. STANLEY, ~~ ~
DELBERT

.

M.

DRAPER,

Attorneys for Plaintiffj/
and Respondents.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
We, th·e undersigned, Paul B. Cannon, Delbert M.
Draper and George B. Stanley, Attorneys for plaintiffs
and respondents in the above -entitled ;cause, hereby
certify that in our opinion the foregoing :Petition for
Re-hearing of said cause in this Court is meritorious and
is well founded in fact as well as in law.

Q

t-:w/{3.~~

B. (lANNON,
DELBERT M. DRAPER,'

PAUL

GEORGE

.

B.

ic~

8TA~EY. ,61~
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